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Abstract 
In this paper, we proposed a new attack against Hwang et al.’s 
cryptosystem. This cryptosystem uses a super-increasing 
sequence as private key and the authors investigate a new 
algorithm called permutation combination algorithm to enhance 
density of knapsack to avoid the low-density attack. Sattar J. 
Aboud [Aboud j. Sattar, “An improved knapsack public key 
cryptography system”, International Journal of Internet 
Technology and Secured Transactions, Vol.3 (3), pp.310-319, 
2011] used Shamir’s attack on the basic Merkle-Hellman 
cryptosystem to break this cryptosystem. Due to use of 
Lenstera’s integer programming, Lagarias showed that Shamir’s 
attack is inefficient in practice; So, Aboud’s attack is impractical 
too. 
 
In this paper, we introduce a direct attack against Hwang et al.’s 
cryptosystem based on Lattice basis reduction algorithms. By 
computing complexity of propose attack, we show that unlike 
Aboud’s cryptanalysis, our cryptanalysis is more efficient and 
practicable. 
Key words: Knapsack-type cryptosystem, LLL-lattice basis 
reduction algorithm, simultaneous Diophantine approximation, 
Cryptanalysis. 
1. Introduction 
The first knapsack-type public key cryptosystem (PKC) 
was introduced by Merkle and Hellman[12]. Since its 
proposal, knapsack-type PKC had been widely studied and 
many knapsack PKCs were developed. However, almost 
all knapsack cryptosystems were shown insecure in that 
they are vulnerable to some known attacks, such as low 
density attack [2,8], orthogonal lattice attack [15], ... . 
 
Nowadays, we reconsider knapsack public key 
cryptography because Shor [17] showed that integer 
factorization and discrete logarithm problems can be easily 
solved by using quantum computers. Therefore, traditional 
public key cryptosystem based on the two problems cannot 
be used to provide privacy protections any longer and 
public key cryptosystems secure in quantum computing 
environments are needed to be developed. The knapsack 
problem is NP-complete [14]. Hence, we can design 
cryptosystems based on the knapsack problem in order to 
resist quantum attacks. On the other hand, although the 
underlying problem is NP-complete, but some of the 
knapsack cryptosystems such as Merkle-Hellman [16], 
Chor-Rivest [18], was broken due to the special structure 
of the private key and the mathematical way that public 
key (public knapsack) was built from the private key. 
 
M. S. Hwang et al. [6] introduced a new knapsack type 
public key cryptosystem in 2009. This cryptosystem is 
based on basic Merkel-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem 
[12] and uses a super-increasing sequence as private key. 
They investigate a new algorithm called permutation 
combination algorithm. By exploiting this algorithm, the 
authors attempted to enhance density of knapsack to avoid 
the low-density attack. Hwang et al. knapsack-type 
cryptosystem was attacked by Aboud [1]. Aboud’s attack 
is based on Shamir’s attack [16] on the basic Merkle-
Hellman cryptosystem. Lagarias [9] showed due to use of 
Lenstera’s integer programming, Shamir’s attack is 
inefficient in practice, so, Aboud’s attack is not practicable. 
 
In this paper, we use LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm 
for analysis Hwang et al.’s knapsack-type cryptosystem. 
The LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm is a crucial 
component in many number-theoretic algorithms. It is 
useful for solving certain knapsack (subset sum) problems, 
and has been used for cryptanalyzeing public-key 
encryption schemes which are based on the subset sum 
problem. We show that because of the special structure in 
the key generation stage, we can use the LLL-lattice basis 
reduction algorithm for cryptanalyzeing Hwang et al.’s 
cryptosystem and obtain equivalent private keys (super-
increasing sequences). 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the 
following section, we briefly explain some mathematical 
background. These concepts are useful for understanding 
the security analysis of the Hwang et al.’s cryptosystem. 
Then, in Section 3, we review Hwang et al.’s knapsack 
cryptosystem. New cryptanalysis of this cryptosystem will 
be discussed in Section 4 and in section 5, we compute the 
computational complexity of the proposed attack. 
  
2. Mathematical Background 
In this section, we recall some concepts about the subset-
sum problem and lattice theory. These concepts are useful 
to understand the security analysis of the Hwang et al.’s 
cryptosystem. 
 
The subset sum problem is stated as follows: 
Definition1. (Subset sum problem (SSP)). A set of positive 
integers 1 2( , , , )na a a…
 
and positive integer s is given. 
Whether there is a subset of the ia ’s that their sum equal to
s . That is equivalent to determine whether there are 
variables {0,1}, 1ix i n∈ ≤ ≤  such that 
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The Subset sum problem is a particular case of the 0-1 
knapsack problem. The subset sum problem has been 
proven to be NP-complete. The computational version of 
the subset sum problem is NP-hard [13]. 
Definition2. (super-increasing sequence). ) The sequence
1 2( , , , )na a a… of positive integers is a super-increasing 
sequence, if 11iji ja a−=> ∑ for all 2i ≥ . 
There is an efficient greedy algorithm to solve the subset 
sum problem if the ia  are a super-increasing sequence: Just 
subtract the largest possible value from s and repeat. 
Algorithm1 efficiently solves the subset sum problem for 
super-increasing sequences in the polynomial time. 
  
Algorithm1:Solving a super-increasing subset sum 
problem 
INPUT: super-increasing sequence 1 2( , , , )na a a…
 
and an 
integer s
 
which is the sum of a subset of the ia s. 
OUTPUT: 1 2( , , , )nx x x…  where {0,1}ix ∈ , such that
1 .
n
i i is a x== ∑ . 
1. i n←  
2. While 1i ≥  do the following: 
2.2. If  is a≥ then 1ix ←  and is s a← −   Otherwise  
               0ix ← .  
2.3. 1i i← −  
3. Return( 1 2( , , , )nx x x… ). 
 
Knapsack public-key encryption schemes are based on the 
subset sum problem, which is NP-complete. The basic idea 
is to select an instance of the subset sum problem that is 
easy to solve, and then to disguise it as an instance of the 
general subset sum problem which is hopefully difficult to 
solve. The original knapsack set can serve as the private 
key, while the transformed knapsack set serves as the 
public key. 
Definition3. Let  = (,  , . . . , )  and 
 = (
 , 
 , . . . , 
) 
be two vectors in ℝ. The inner product of  and 
 is the 
real number  
< , 
 >	= 
+	
+	. . . +
 
Definition4. Let 
 = (
 , 
 , . . . , 
) be a vector in ℝ. The ℓ norm (or Euclid norm) of 
 is the real number 
2 2 2
1 2, .ny y y y y y= < > = + + +⋯  
The sup norm, maximum norm or ℓ norm is: 
‖
‖ = max,,…,|
| 
We can show that  
‖
‖ ≤ ‖
‖ 
Definition5. Let {,  ,… , }  be a set of linearly 
independent vectors in ℝ ( ≤  ). The set ! of all integer 
linear combinations of  ,  ,… ,   is called a lattice of 
dimension; that is 
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The vectors  , , … ,  are called a basis for the lattice !. 
Definition6. (Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization).  
Let {,  ,… , } be an arbitrary basis of ℝ. Define the 
vectors 	∗, 1 ≤ $ ≤   inductively by 
∗ =  −&',((∗)( 			 
Where 	',( = *+,,+-∗.*+-∗,+-∗.	 for 1 ≤ $ ≤  . In particular ∗ = .  
We will call ∗, ∗,… , ∗ the Gram-Schmidt orthogonal 
basis of  { ,  ,… , } and the ∗ together ',( form the 
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of  { ,  ,… , }. 
A lattice can have many different bases. A basis consisting 
of vectors of relatively small lengths is called reduced. 
The following definition provides a useful notion of a 
reduced basis, and is based on the Gram-Schmidt 
orthogonalization procedure.  
  
Definition7. Let  ,  ,… ,  ∈ ℝ be linearly independent 
and ∗, ∗, … , ∗ the corresponding Gram-Schmidt 
orthogonal basis. Then { , ,… , } is reduced if ‖∗‖ ≤2‖1∗ ‖ for 1 ≤ $ <  . So we have 
‖‖ = ‖∗‖ ≤ 2‖∗‖ ≤ 2‖2∗‖ ≤ ⋯ ≤ 2)‖∗‖. 
The basis { ,  ,… , }  is said to be reduced (more 
precisely, Lovász-reduced) if 
4',(4 ≤ 12 , 56			1 ≤ 7 < $ ≤  			 
(where 4',(4  denotes the absolute value of ',( ), and 
‖∗‖ ≥ 92: 	−	',);‖)∗ ‖						56		1 < $ <  . 
The LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm is a crucial 
component in many number-theoretic algorithms such as 
simultaneous Diophantine approximation Problem. It is 
useful for solving certain subset sum problems, and has 
been used for cryptanalyzeing public-key encryption 
schemes which are based on the subset sum problem. 
Algorithm2[13]: LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm  
INPUT: a basis{ , ,… , } for a lattice	! in ℝ , ≥  . 
OUTPUT: a reduced basis for !. 
1. ∗ ←  , = ←	< ∗, ∗ >. 
2. For $ from 2 to   do the following: 
2.1 ∗ ← . 
2.2 For 7  from 1  to $ − 1 , set ',( ←	<  , (∗ >/=(  and ∗ ← ∗ − ',((∗. 
2.3 = ←	< ∗, ∗ > . 
3. ? ← 2. 
4. Execute subroutine @AB(?, ? − 1) to possibly 
update some ',(. 
5. If =C < (2:− 'C,C) )=C) then do the following: 
5.1 Set μ ← μE,E), = ← =C + '=C) , 
              'C,C) ← '=C)/=,  =C ← =C)=C/= and 
            =C) ← =. 
5.2 Exchange C and C). 
5.3 If ? > 2 then exchange 'C,( and 'C),( for  
       7 = 1, 2,… , ? − 2. 
5.4 For $ = ? + 1, ? + 2,… , : 
             Set  F ← ',(, ',C ← ',C) − 'F, and 
             ',C) ← t + μE,E) − μH,E. 
5.5 ? ← I	(2, ? − 1). 
5.6 Go to step 4. 
         Otherwise, for J = ? − 2, ? − 3,… ,1, execute 
         @AB(?, J), and finally set ? ← ? + 1. 
6. If ? ≤   then go to step 4. Otherwise, return { ,  ,… , }. 
@AB(?, J): If 4'C,L4 > 1/2 then do the following: 
1. 6 ← M0.5 + 'C,LP	, C ← C − 6L. 
2. For 7 from 1 to J − 1, set  'C,( ← 'C,( − 6'L,(. 
3. 'C,L ← 'C,L − 6. 
 
The LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm is a polynomial-
time algorithm for finding a reduced basis, given a basis 
for a lattice. 
Theorem1. Let ! ⊂ ℤ be a lattice with basis {,  , … , }, and let S ∈ ℝ, S ≥ 2 be such that	‖‖ ≤S for $ = 1, 2, . . . ,  . Then the number of arithmetic 
operations needed by Algorithm2 is T( :	J5US), on 
integers of size T( 	J5U	S) bits, which is polynomial time. 
Proof: see [11]. 
Lemma 1. Let  ,  ,… ,  be a LLL reduced basis of a 
rational lattice ! ⊂ ℚ and ∗, ∗,… , ∗ be its Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalization. Then 
                             WXF(!) = ∏ |∗| . 
Proof: see [5].  
Definition8. (Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation 
Problem). Let I, I, … , I ∈ ℝ and let Z > 0. Let [ ∈ ℕ 
be an integer such that [ ≥ Z) . The simultaneous 
diophantine approximation problem is to find (], ^, … , ^) ∈ ℤ such that 0 < ] ≤ [ and 
|I − ^/]| 	≤ Z/] 
 for all 1 ≤ $ ≤  . 
A major application of algorithm2 is to give an algorithm 
to compute the integers (], ^, … , ^) in Definition8. In 
practice, the real numbers I, I, … , I are given to some 
decimal precision (and so are rational numbers with 
coefficients of some size). The size of an instance of the 
simultaneous Diophantine approximation is the sum of the 
bit lengths of the numerator and denominator of the given 
approximations to the I, together with the bit length of 
the representation of _ and [. Let ` be a bound on the 
absolute value of all numerators and denominators of the I.The computational task is to find a solution (], ^, …	 , ^) in time which is polynomial in  , log(`), log(1/_) and log Q. 
  
 Theorem2. (Solving the simultaneous Diophantine 
approximation problem). Let I , I ,… , I ∈ ℚ be given as 
rational numbers with numerator and denominator 
bounded in absolute value by `. Let 0 < Z < 1. One can 
compute in polynomial time integers (], ^ ,… , ^) such that                      0 < ] < 2(1)/:Z)(1)	and |I − ^/]| 	≤ Z/] for all           1 ≤ $ ≤  . 
Proof: A general proof of this theorem is given in [7] but 
we introduce different and simple proof. 
Let [	 =	 2(1)/:Z) and ! ⊆ ℚ1 be the lattice by the 
rows f, … ,  ∈ ℚ1  of the matrix 
g
hi
Z/[ 	I 		I0 −1 	00 	0 −1
⋯ I⋯ 0	 	⋮				 ⋮0				 0									 ⋱ ⋮⋯ −1l
mn	
The dimension is  + 1 and the determinant is Z/[ =2)(1)/:Z1	. The entries of the lattice are ratios of 
integers with absolute value bounded by I{`, o(opq)/rsopq }. 
Note that the lattice ! does not have a basis with entries in ℤ, but rather in ℚ.  
The LLL algorithm applied to !, outputs a non-zero vector t = (t,… , t) = (]Z/[, ]I − ^ , ]I − ^ ,… , ]I − ^). 
If t is the smallest vector found by the LLL-algorithm, 
then from definition7, we have 
‖t‖ ≤ ‖f∗‖ ≤ 2‖∗‖ ≤ 2‖∗‖ ≤ ⋯ ≤ 2‖∗‖. 
By multiplying together the  + 1 above inequality, we 
have  
              ‖t‖(1) ≤ ‖f∗‖. 2‖∗‖…2‖∗‖ 
                            ≤ 2(1)/‖f∗‖…	‖∗‖ 
Hence, 
             ‖t‖ ≤ 2/:(‖f∗‖…	‖∗‖)/(1) 
From lemma 1, we know that WXF(!) = ∏ |∗|  and so   
‖t‖ ≤ 2/:WXF(!)/(1) = 2/:2)/:Z	 = Z < 1. 
If ] = 0  then t = (0,−^ ,−^ ,… , −^)  with some ^ ≠ 0 
and so ‖t‖ ≥ 1, hence	] ≠ 0. Without loss of generality, ] > 0 . Since ‖t‖∞ ≤ ‖t‖  and ‖t‖ < Z < 1  it follows that ]Z/[ < Z < 1 (where	‖t‖∞ = ]Z/[ = t) and so 
 	0 < ] < [/Z = 2(1)/:Z)(1). 
Similarly, for other t , 2 ≤ $ ≤   we have |]I − ^| ≤ Z 
and so  
|I − ^/]| 	≤ Z/]    for 1 ≤ $ ≤  . 
 
Theorem3. If we use LLL algorithm for solving 
Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation Problem, then 
the computational complexity of the problem is                	T( v	I{ 	J5U(`),   	+  	J5U(1/Z)}2), which is 
polynomial time. 
Proof: See [7]. 
3. Hwang Et Al.’s Cryptosystem 
Hwang et al.’s cryptosystem is based on the basic Merkle-
Hellman knapsack cryptosystem.  
3.1 Key Generation: 
Each user chooses a super-increasing sequence (w, w	, …	, w2vf) as secret key. i.e. 
w > ∑ w()( 				($ = 1, 2, … , 1360). 
Choose a large prime ^ as modulus such that	^ > ∑ w2vf , 
two modular multipliers z and z′ such that U|W(^,z) = 1,  
and z.z} = 1		5W	^. Each user transfers super-increasing 
sequence ~ = (w ,w	, …	 , w2vf)  into a pseudorandom 
sequence  = (I , I	,…	 , I2vf) as follows: 
 
              I 	= 	w 	. z	5W	^		,			(1 ≤ $ ≤ 1360)                  (1) 
 
The public key is (I, I	, …	, I2vf) and the private key is {(w, w	, …	 , w2vf), z,z} , ^}. 
They presented a permutation combination algorithm and 
used this algorithm to ensure the security of the 
cryptosystem. By exploiting this algorithm, they attempted to 
enhance density of knapsack to avoid the low-density attack [2, 
8]. The permutation algorithm is as follows: 
1.  Define an original sequence Bf = {A, A) , A),… , A , A: , A2, A , A}. 
2. Recombine all the elements of the original 
sequence Bf  which obtain ( ! 	− 	1)  sequences B , . . . , B(!)). The sequences B($ = 1,2, … ,  ! − 1) are 
defined as follows: Bf = {A , A), A) ,… , A , A:, A2 , A, A} B = {A, A) , A),… ,A , A: , A2, A , A} ⋮ B!) = {A , A, A2A:,… , A), A), A	} 
3. Suppose we can compute B for	1 ≤  ≤  ! − 1.  can be written as  = ∑ ( − $)! , 0 ≤  ≤  . 
Each sequence has an own corresponding value called the 
  
factorial carry value, { , ), … . , , } . Using the 
factorial carry value, we can efficiently obtain any 
sequence with the following algorithm.  
 
Algorithm 3: permutation combination algorithm 
INPUT: Bf = (A , A,… , A) and integers . 
OUTPUT: B = (A} , A} ,… , A2}).  
 = ∑  × ( − $)!. 
For 1 ≤ $ ≤   do 
               if 	 	= 	0 then 
                       A′	 	=	A	; 
       else { 
               for (1 ≤ 	7 ≤ $) do 
               A′1( 	=	A	}; 
Return (A} , A} ,… , A2} ). 
 
For instance, generate the original vector 	B0 =(, ~, S, B, A, =). Find the result of Bff	:	100 = 0 × 5! + 4 ×4! + 0 × 3! + 2 × 2! + 0 × 1! + 0 then Bff =(, =, ~,A, S, B).  
3.2 Encryption:  
For  encrypt the message  , the sender executes the 
following steps:  
1.  Select a hash function whose digest is 1024 bits and 
compute the digest B of  as B = f:(). 
2. Compute  B} = B	5W	170!  
3. Compute the factorial carry value  = {, , … , f} of B′ where B} =  × 169! +  ×168! +⋯+ f × 0! 
4. Divide the public key vector  = (I, I	, …	 , I2vf) 
into 8 subset public key vectors. Each subset public key 
vector has 170 elements. 
	 = {(I, I	,…	, If), . . . , (I, I	, …	, I2vf)}. 
5. Recombine each subset public key vector using            = {, , … , f}  by means of the permutation 
combination Algorithm. Then chooses the first 128 
elements in each subset public key vector. Thus, the 
sender obtain 1024 elements 	 =(I, I, … , If:). 
6. The message  is divided into {,,… ,(}. Each                C 	(? = 1, 2,… , 7) is a 1024-bit message: 
C = {C, ,… , C,f:} 
7. The corresponding ciphertext SC  is given as the 
product of 	 = (I, I ,… , If:)  and C  (? =1,2,… , 7). 
SC = ∑ If: × C, 	,			1 ≤ ? ≤ 7. 
The ciphertext is S = {S, . . . , S(} and sends (S, B}) to the 
receiver. 
3.3 Decryption: 
Receiver after receiving (S, B}) , executes the following 
steps to derive  from	S and B′: 
 
1.  Compute the factorial carry value  = {, , … , f} of B′ where 
B} =  × 169! +  × 168! + ⋯ , f × 0. 
2. Divide his/her secret key vector ~ = (w, w, … , w2vf)  into 8 subset public key 
vectors. Each key vector has 170 elements. 
          ~ =	{(w , w	,…	, wf), . . . , (w, w	,…	 , w2vf)}. 
3. Recombine each subset public key vector using            = {, , … , f}  by means of the Permutation 
Combination Algorithm. Then chooses the first 128 
elements in each subset public key vector. The receiver 
obtain 1024 elements ~ = (w , w ,… , wf: ). 
However ~ = (w , w ,… , wf:)  is still a super-
increasing sequence. 
5.  Divide S into S = {S, . . . , S(}. Each SC 	(? = 1, 2,… , 7) 
is a 1024-bit ciphertext. 
6.  Compute 
                      BC = SC ×z}	5W	^ 
                            = ∑ (If: × C,) × z}	5W	^ 
                            = ∑ (wf: ×z × C,) × z}	5W	^ 
                            = ∑ wf: × C, 	5W	^ 
for ? = 1,2,… , 7 . So we have BC = ∑ wf: × C, 	5W	^. 
Since ^ > ∑ w2vf  we have BC = ∑ wf: × C, 	. Hence, 
the receiver can solves these super-increasing knapsack 
problems with algorithm1 and obtains C,  for 1 ≤ $ ≤1024  and 1 ≤ ? ≤ 7 . Therefore, we can recover original 
message  = { , ,… ,(} where	C = {C, ,… , C,f:}. 
 
Aboud attacked this cryptosystem by using Shamir’s 
attack [16] on the basic Merkle-Hellman cryptosystem. As 
we said, Lagarias in [9] showed Shamir’s attack is 
inefficient in practice, so Aboud’s attack is not practicable. 
  
4. Our Proposed Attack 
In this section, we present our attack against the Hwang et 
al.’s knapsack cryptosystem. The first step in the attack is 
noticing that the given knapsack problem | = ∑ I  
(with public weights (I , I , . . . , I) and target |) can be 
transformed into infinitely many different easy knapsack 
problems with super-increasing weights (I′ , I′ , . . . , I′) and 
target		|′. This was independently observed by Eier-Lagger 
[4] and Desmedt-Vanderwalle-Govaerts [3]. Their result can 
be summarized in the following lemma. 
Let (w , w ,… , w) be the private super-increasing sequence, (I , I , . . . , I)  be the Corresponding public key such that I = 	z. w 	5W	^  and ,^  be defined as in section 3. Let  = z)	5W	^, so we have 
w = 	. I 	5W	^. 
Lemma 2. There exists an	_ > 0 such that if ′′ is rational 
with ′′ −  < _ , then the weights (w′ , w′ , . . . , w′)  where w′ = ′I 		5W	^′ for $ = 1, . . . ,   are super-increasing. 
 
Our attack consists of three steps: in step1, we can use 
LLL-lattice basis reduction algorithm for finding a super-
increasing sequence ~′ = (w′ , w′	,…	 , w′2vf ) that is very 
close to super-increasing sequence ~ = (w , w	, …	, w). In 
step2 and step3 we use super-increasing sequence ~′ =(w′, w′	, …	, w′2vf ) and public ciphertext (S, B′)  for 
recover the plaintext.  
 
Step1: 
In the general form, equation (1) can be written as follows: 
I = w . z	5W	^,						1 ≤ $ ≤  . 
Where (I, I	, …	 , I) is the public key and (w, w	,…	 , w) 
is the private key. 
 Let  = z)	5W	^ where 1 ≤  < ^. We have 
       w = I . z)5W	^ = I . 	5W	^, 1 ≤ $ ≤                 (2) 
This means that for 1 ≤ $ ≤  , there exists some integers ? 	such that 
I − ?^ = w 
and 0 ≤ ? < I. Hence, 
                     0 ≤ /^ − ?/I = w/I^.                    (3) 
Since (w , w ,… , w) is a super-increasing sequence, so w ≥ 2) and with ^ > ∑ w  we have 
0 ≤ w < ^/2) 
Hence 
0 ≤ /^ − ?/I < 1/I2). 
In particular, the right side of  /^ − ?/I < 1/(I2)) is 
very small. Hence, we can assume 
                                   /^ ≈ ?/I.                                   (4) 
From equation (4), If we take } = ?  and ^} = I , then  ′/^′ is very close to /^ and from lemma 2, the positive 
integers w′ = ′I 		5W	^}  for 1 ≤ $ ≤   are a super-
increasing sequence (note that I’s are public and obvious).  
Subtracting the case $ = 1 of equation (3) from the $-th gives 
?I − ?I = wI^ − wI^ = Iw − IwII^  
and so, for 2	 ≤ $ ≤  , 
   
|I? − I?| = |q,),q| < , = 2w < o,q      (5) 
Since I  is public, It remains to compute the integer ? 
such that equation (5) holds, given only the integers I, I, . . . , I. Another way to write equation (5) is 
   
,q − C,Cq < qCqo,q , 2	 ≤ $ ≤   .          (6) 
and one sees that the problem is precisely simultaneous 
Diophantine approximation. 
From theorem2, We can solve the simultaneous 
Diophantine approximation in the polynomial time and 
find a value for ?. We now set } = ? and ^′ = I (note 
that I  is public) and computes w′ = ′I 	5W	^′  for 1 ≤ $ ≤   to obtain the sequence (w′ , w′ , . . . , w′) , as we 
said this is a super-increasing sequence. We then compute |} = ′|	(5W	^′)  for any challenge ciphertext 	| . Since (w} ,w} , . . . , w})  is super-increasing sequence, we can 
solve an easy knapsack problem |} = ∑  w′  with 
algorithm1 and therefore the original message bits  , 1 ≤ $ ≤   are recovered. 
 
Let [ = 2(1)/:Z) and  = Z/[. We can use LLL-lattice 
basis reduction for solve equation (5) (simultaneous 
Diophantine approximation) and hence, the value of  ′ = ?  is determind. Consider the lattice !(B)  with 
dimension J + 1 and basis matrix  
B =
g
hi
 	I 		I20 −	I 	00 	0 −	I
⋯ IL⋯ 0	 	⋮				 ⋮0				 0									 ⋱ ⋮⋯ −	Il
mn	
  
where 0 <  < 1 and 1 < J <  . LLL-lattice basis reduction 
algorithm can be applied to the lattice !(B) to output a 
relatively short vector	t = (t1, t2,… , tJ), which can be 
used to approximate the simultaneous Diophantine 
approximation problem. Since t ∈ !(B), there exist 
integers ?	, ?,… , ?L such that 
        t = (t , t,… , tL) 
           = (? , ?I− ?I , ?I2− ?2I ,… , ?IL − ?LI) 
 where (I, I	, …	, IL) is the public key. After computing t = (t, t,… , tL) with LLL-lattice basis reduction 
algorithm, we can compute ? from equation t = ?. 
With the pair (′, ^′) = (? , I), we now compute integers 
w′ = I . }5W	^} ,				1 ≤ $ ≤ n 
which form lemma 2, this is a super-increasing sequence. 
We can use this sequence in place of to private key (w, w, … , w). 
 
Step2: 
We can eavesdrop public ciphertext (S, B}) from insecure 
channel and hence we can compute factorial carry value  = { ,  ,… , f} of B′ where B} =  × 169! +  × 168! +⋯+ f × 0! 
with the following algorithm. 
 
Algorithm4: compute the factorial carry value of integer  
INPUT: integers ,  such that  <  !. 
OUTPUT: { , , . . . , } such that 0 ≤  ≤  − $ and        	 = ∑  × ( − $)!. 
1. 6f ←  
2. for $ = 1 to   
               do   ←  ,q(1))!																											6 ← 6) −  × ( + 1 − $)! 
3. Return "{,  , . . . , }" 
 
Step3: 
We divide super-increasing sequence (w′, w′,… , w′ ) 
(which is computed in step1) into 8 subset public key 
vectors: 
                ~′ =	 {(w′, w′ ,… , w′f), 
                            
(w′, w′ , … , w′2:f), 
                                         ⋮ 
                            
(w′, w′ , … , w′)}. 
and recombine each subset public key vector using 
factorial carry value 	 = ( , ,… , f ) (which is 
computed in step2) by means of the permutation 
combination algorithm. Similar Hwang et al.’s 
cryptosystem, we can choose first 128 elements in each 
subset public key vector. Then, we will obtain 1024 
elements (w} , w},… , w}f:) .  
With computed pair (′, ^′)  from step1, first compute S′ = S ×  ′	5W	^′ and then divide S′ into S′ = {S′, . . . , S′(}. 
Each SC 	, 1 ≤ ? ≤ 7  is a 1024-bit message. Now, since (w}, w},… , w}f:)  is super-increasing sequence, we 
can use algorithm1 for solve the following super-
increasing subset sum problems: 
                      S′ = ∑ 		w′f: × , 		5W	^′ 
                        S′ = ∑ 		w′f: × , 		5W	^′                       (7) 
⋮ 
                       S′( = ∑ 		w′f: × (, 		5W	^′ 
and recover message bits C = {C,,… , C,f:}, 1 ≤ ? ≤ 7 
to obtain the original message  = { ,,… ,(} for any 
challenge ciphertext (S, B}). 
5.  Performance Analysis of Attack 
As we see in section 4, in step1, we need to find a pair of 
integers (′, ^′) such that }/^′ is very close to /^ (where  = z)	(5W	^) and ^ are parts of the private key and (I, I	, …	 , I) is public key). As we showed, we can take ^′ = I where I is public. So we need to find a value for } = ?. In step2, we can use algorithm4 for find the 
factorial carry value  = { , ,… , f} of the public 
value B′. In step3, we need one modular multiplication for 
compute S′ and (1024× 7) subtraction to solve equation 
(7) with algorithm1 for recover the original message	 ={ ,,… ,(} from any challenge ciphertext (S, B}).   
Hence, the more difficult and important part of attack is 
step1. In step1, we used simultaneous Diophantine 
approximation problem for finding the value of } = ? . 
So we need to compute the computational complexity of 
simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem. 
complexity of this problem is given in theorem3 where 
take T( v	I{ 	J5U(`),  	+  	J5U(1/Z)}2) bit operations, 
which is polynomial time. Consequently, the proposed 
attack is polynomial time and practicable. 
  
6.  Conclusion 
We considered cryptanalysis of a knapsack-type public 
key cryptosystem. This cryptosystem uses a combination 
permutation algorithm in the encryption phase to avoid the 
low density attack by keeping the density high. This 
cryptosystem is vulnerable to LLL-lattice basis reduction 
algorithm, since it uses a super-increasing sequence as a 
private key and attempt to hide this sequence with modular 
multiplication for constructing the public key. But as we 
showed, the modular multiplication cannot hide the super-
increasing sequence. To avoid this attack we can choose 
another easy knapsack problem that is not a super-
increasing sequence or we do not use modular 
multiplication for producing the public key from the 
private key. 
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